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Does section 1404(a) of the United States Code permit a district court
to transfer a cause of action, on motion of the plaintiff, to a district where
the defendant is not amenable to process? This question was raised in the
case of Troy v. Poorvu.1 In that case the plaintiff, a resident of Connecticut,
brought an action for personal injuries against the defendants, residents of
Massachusetts, in the federal district court of Massachusetts. The plaintiff then
made a motion to transfer the case to the federal district court of Connecticut
under section 1404(a). The motion to transfer was based on the facts that the
cause of action arose in Connecticut, the witnesses were all there, and the plain-
tiff was so seriously disabled that it would be difficult for him to travel to Mas-
sachusetts. The defendants objected saying that the court does not have the
power to transfer the case under section 1404(a). The basis for the objection
was that 1404(a) allows a case to be transferred to any district "where it might
have been brought", and that it could not be brought in Connecticut because
there could be no jurisdiction over the person of the defendants in that state.
The plaintiff's motion was allowed. The courts rationale is that section 1332(a)
gave the district court of Connecticut jurisdiction of the subject matter and that
venue was proper under section 1391 (a).
Section 1404(a) provides that,2 "For the convenience of parties and wit-
nesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to
any other district or division where it might have been brought". The difficulty
arises in the legislative meaning of the phrase "where it might have been brought".
All courts agree that a case might have been brought wherever there is jur-
isdiction and proper venue. The courts also agree that section 1391(a) is the
statute setting forth the venue requirements. This section states,3 "A civil
action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of citizenship may,
except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in the judicial district
where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside". But, this is as far as the courts
are in agreement. They are divided as to what constitutes jurisdiction.
Those courts which refuse to transfer a case to a district where the de-
fendant is not amenable to process declare that personal jurisdiction is the re-
quirement under section 1404(a) and that federal rule of civil procedure 4(f)
is applicable. This rule states that,4 "All process ... may be served any-
where within the territorial limits of the state in which the district court is
held . . . ." This rationale is in conformity with the common law doctrine
1 132 F. Supp. 864 (1955).
2 62 Stat. 937 (1948), 28 U. S. C. § 1404 (1950).
8 62 Stat. 935 (1948), 28 U. S. C. § 1391 (1950).
4 FED. R. CIv. P. 4(f).
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of forum non conveniens. This is important because the revisor's notes state
that subsection (a) was drafted in accordance with the doctrine of forum non
conveniens and these notes carry great weight in the construction of that sec-
tion.6 Since the doctrine of forum non conveniens does not apply if there is
an absence of jurisdiction, it would follow that 1404(a), which is in accord,
does not apply either.
Those courts which will transfer a case to a district where the defendant
is not amenable to process declare that the jurisdiction required under section
1404(a) is that found under section 1332(a) of the Judiciary Act. As is stated
in this section,6 "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions where the matter in controversy . . . is between citizens of different
states." Why is there this variance in interpretation? It is because these latter
courts feel that the notion that section 1404(a) was a mere codification of
existing law relating to forum non conveniens is erroneous, and the purpose
of that section was to grant broadly the power of transfer.7 Even those courts
refusing a transfer use such terms as "in conformity with", "in essence" and
"in accordance with," but will not state that it is a codification. This hedging
is necessitated by the fact that the courts are permitted to transfer rather than
dismiss a case. What then could the revisors' intent be when they say that the
statute is in accordance with forum non conveniens? It is submitted that they
meant in accordance with the purpose of the doctrine which was to change
venue to another court. They sought to simplify the process. Such simplifica-
tion can be obtained by permitting a court which has personal jurisdiction to
transfer the proceedings of a case including its jurisdiction to a more conven-
ient district. This was recognized when the court said that, ". . . when an ac-
tion is transferred, it remains what it was, and all further proceedings in it
are merely referred to another tribunal, leaving untouched whatever has been
already done".8 Any order transferring a case to another district preserves it
as against the running of the statute of limitations and for all other purposes.9
Even personal jurisdiction over the defendants is transferred by the effect of
the transfer order.' 0 Requiring that the defendants be amenable to process in
the transferee state would make section 1404(a) almost meaningless. If the
defendants are amenable to process, the plaintiff could get into another dis-
trict without 1404 because he could dismiss and initiate a new action in the
more favorable district." This would seem to limit the section's usefulness to
cases where the statute of limitations had run. But, if that was the legislative
purpose, why did the legislature attack the problem so indirectly? It should
5 United States v. Scott & Williams, Inc., 88 F. Supp. 531 (1950).
6 62 Stat. 930 (1948), 28 U. S. C. § 1332 (1950).
7 Aircraft Marine Products, Inc. v. Brundy Engineering Co., 96 F. Supp. 588 (1951).
8 Magnetic Engineering & Manufacturing Co. v. Dings Manufacturing Co., 178 F. 2d 866 (1950).
9 Jiffy Lubricator Co. v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 177 F. 2d 360 (1949).
10 In the Matter of Josephson, 218 F. 2d 174 (1954).
11 Curtailing The Scope of 1404(a)-Round Two, 60 YALE L. R. 183 (1951).
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also be noted that section 1391, which both sides agree must necessarily be
read along with 1404(a), goes to the basic power of the court. Would it not
also be reasonable to apply section 1332, since it too goes to the court's basic
power, rather than to look to the procedural rules of court?
The inequity of the first argument may be seen in a recent case where the
plaintiff was unable to obtain personal jurisdiction and venue as the court,
following the first view, required. This resulted in his action being dismissed.' 2
Under the rationale of the second view, such an unfair result would not arise.
WILLIAM McBRIDE




"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws."
Thus reads the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion of the United States. In furtherance of the purpose of this Amendment,
Title 42 U. S. C. A. § 1981 was enacted. It states that:
"All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have
the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce con-
tracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal bene-
fit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property
as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment,
pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to noother."
The action inhibited by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment is
action of the states only.' The amendment does not afford protection against
merely private conduct, whether it be discriminatory or not.2
The first problem which is met in regard to the application of the Four-
teenth Amendment and the supplemental legislation, is the meaning of "state
action."
In the Shelley case 3 it was stated that "state action," as that phrase is under-
stood in light of the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment, refers to exertions
of state power in all forms. In this case private agreements between property
owners of one district sought to restrict the use of their property to persons of
the Caucasian race. Land was sold to negroes by one of the parties and the other
parties subject to the terms of the restrictive covenant brought suit in a Mis-
souri state court to restrain the negroes from taking possession of the property,
divest title from them and revest title in such person as the court should di-
rect. The trial court denied relief on the ground that the restrictive agreement
never became final and complete as it was never signed by all the property own-
ers in the district. The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed, and directed the
trial court to grant the relief for which was prayed. The Supreme Court of the
United States reversed the Missouri Supreme Court on the ground that the en-
forcement of the restrictions was state participation and in granting judicial en-
forcement the state had denied the petitioners the equal protection of the laws.
I Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1 (1947).
2 United States v. Harris, 106 U. S. 629 (1883).
8 See n. 1, supra.
4 Title 42 U. S. C. A. §§ 1981, 1983 (Supp. 1954).
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The Supreme Court, in rendering this decision, reviewed the operation of
the Fourteenth Amendment and related legislation 4 from the Civil Rights Cases'
to the present time. In the course of the opinion, Chief Justice Vinson stated
that the power of a state to create and enforce property interests must be ex-
ercised within the boundaries defined by the Fourteenth Amendment, and that
judicial action is not immunized from the operation of this amendment simply
because it is taken pursuant to the state's common law policy. In reference to
the interpretation of state action within the meaning of the amendment it was
felt that this term includes the action of state courts and judicial officers in
their official capacities, and, as has been pointed out, it refers to the executions
of state power in all forms.
The recent North Carolina case of Charlotte Park and Recreation Commis-
sion v. Barringer6 should be considered with the above brief background in mind.
The action involved in this case was for a declaratory judgment in order to de-
termine the validity of restrictions and reverter clauses in certain deeds. These
deeds involved the conveyance of lands to the Charlotte Park and Recreation
Commission and each contained similar provisions and restrictions. The sub-
ject of this discussion will be the deed from Osmond L. Barringer and his wife
to the commission, in which was conveyed certain land to the commission for
use as a park, playground and recreational system to be known as Revolution Park.
This deed in the granting clause conveys the land to the commission ". . . upon
the terms and conditions, and for the uses and purposes, as hereinafter fully
set forth." The habendum clause is to have and to hold the land "upon the
following uses and purposes, and none other." One of the purposes being
that this land together with the lands conveyed in the other aforementioned
deeds, be used for the operation of Revolution Park, and the other purpose
being that the park is "for the use of, and to be used and enjoyed by persons
of the white race only." The deed also contained language to the effect that
if Revolution Park should not be used and maintained as a park, playground
and/or recreational area, for use by the white race, the lands hereby con-
veyed shall revert in fee simple to Osmond L. Barringer, his heirs or assigns.
The commission has a swimming pool, tennis courts and golf course in
Revolution Park, which it operates and maintains as part of the recreational
system of Charlotte. This golf course is the only one operated and maintained
by the commission, and it and the other recreational features of Revolution
Park are operated for the exclusive use of members of the white race. The golf
course is situated on the lands conveyed to the commission by two grantors
other than the petitioner Barringer. In December, 1951, certain defendants
presented a petition to the commission stating that they were negroes, and for
this reason they have been denied the right to use this golf course, in viola-
5 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
6 88 S. E. 2d 114 (1955).
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tion of their constitutional rights. A declaratory judgment action was then
brought to determine the validity of the restrictions and reverter clauses in the
deeds.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina sustained the validity of the Bar-
ringer deed as found by the lower court. In reference to this deed the court
quoted language from Tiffany on Real Property7 to the effect that no set for-
mula is necessary for the creation of a limitation, and any words expressive of
the grantor's intent that the estate shall terminate on the occurrence of the event
is sufficient. The court also pointed out that North Carolina recognizes the
validity of determinable fees, and that it is a distinct characteristic of a fee
determinable upon limitation that the estate automatically reverts at once on
the occurrence of the event by which it is limited, by virtue of the limitation
in the written instrument creating such fee. The court declared:
"The operation of this reversion provision is not by any judicial
enforcement by the State Courts of North Carolina, and Shelley v.
Kraemer, has no application. We do not see how any rights of appellants
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
Section 1, or any rights secured to them by Title 42 U. S. C. A. §§
1981, 1983, are violated."
The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmatively declares that the opera-
tion of a reversion provision of a determinable fee is automatic and not by
any judicial enforcement, thereby attempting to distinguish this case from the
Shelley case and its forerunners. If it be conceded that a valid determinable
fee is present from the standpoint of construction, is there a distinguishing fea-
ture in this case which causes an evasion of the application of the Fourteenth
Amendment? We have noted that the amendment does not pertain to private
agreements between individuals, no matter how discriminatory. But, the in-
tervention of state enforcement, in whatever form, causes the application of
this amendment.
It is this writer's contention that the discriminatory provision in the
Barringer deed is violative of the Fourteenth Amendment for two reasons: (1)
indirect state enforcement through judicial action, and (2) direct state en-
forcement by the Charlotte Park and Recreation Commission.
(1) The judicial enforcement is present due to the fact that the courts
of North Carolina entertained the action for a declaratory judgment. The North
Carolina Supreme Court has attempted to distinguish the instant case, which
involves a determinable fee, from other cases involving restrictive agreements
and covenants, on the ground that the operation of the reverter provision is not
by any judicial enforcement. It is true that a reverter clause does terminate the
limited estate automatically upon the occurrance of the stated event by op-
7 TIFFANY REAL PROPERTY § 220 (3rd ed. 1939).
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eration of law, and that no judicial enforcement is necessary to accomplish
this result. But this is also true of other private agreements and restrictions en-
tered into by individuals. Difficulty ensues, however, when agreements, re-
strictions, etc. are brought into court for some reason. When the court takes
jurisdiction of the case and enforces, whether by declaratory judgment or some
other form of judicial proceeding, the discriminatory provisions, whether they
be in the form of reverter clauses or restrictive covenants, it is then that state
action is in contravention to the Fourteenth Amendment. No distinction, there-
fore, can be made between the type of enforcement when the state court takes
jurisdiction to determine the validity of a discriminatory determinable fee, and
when it takes jurisdiction to enforce or restrain restrictive covenants.
(2) Direct state enforcement is present due to the fact that the Charlotte
Park and Recreation Commission is an agency created by the City of Charlotte,
and it has enforced the discriminatory feature of the deed in regard to the op-
eration of Revolution Park. It has been held that local ordinances, discrimina-
tory in nature, are violative of equal protection under the laws and the Four-
teenth Amendment. Recognition and enforcement by the City of Charlotte,
likewise being enforcement by a state agency, is invalid.
The North Carolina Supreme Court, by its decision, has opened the door
to state enforcement of discriminatory provisions. This kind of decision dear-
ly side-steps the language of Chief Justice Vinson when he said: 8
"It cannot be doubted that among the civil rights intended to be
protected from discriminatory state action by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment are the rights to acquire, enjoy, own and dispose of property.
Equality in the enjoyment of property rights was regarded by the framers
of that Amendment as an essential precondition to the realization of
other basic civil rights and liberties which the Amendment was intended
to guarantee."
ALFRED M. ISAACS
R See n. 1, supra.
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